March 28, 1946: U.S. State Department issued the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which shows how the United States perceived the global threat of nuclear warfare in the early stages of the Cold War. The report made clear that an international regulatory program was necessary to prevent the nuclear arms race from spiraling out of control. By June, the U.S. presented a modified and watered down version of the Acheson-Lilienthal policy proposal to the United Nations. Moscow used its veto to halt this so-called Baruch Plan in the Security Council. As Cold War tensions sizzled, a major issue in these investigations was a lack of trust. The initial report emphasized that inspections would never be enough to internationally regulate nuclear weapons. This was because the technology was advancing too fast to adequately monitor and countries could not be expected to share their most powerful military secrets with their potential enemies. In other words, “One cannot effectively inspect if the purpose of the operator is to conceal the discoveries by which he hopes to evade inspection.” In a war that was cold rather than hot, at least on the most theoretical level, deception was both a primary fear and a primary strategy.
Citations: Department of State, The Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Washington, D.C., March 16, 1946), 5-6, 12-13, https://fissilematerials.org/library/ach46.pdf; Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33, 35, https://archive.org/details/deanachesonlifei00beis; Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, “Missile, Surface-to-Surface, SS-20 ‘Pioneer,’” missile (Soviet Union, date unknown), https://www.si.edu/object/missile-surface-surface-ss-20-pioneer:nasm_A19900275000.
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